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Is an Ounce of Prevention Worth an Ounce of Cure?  Explaining 
the Decline in Cardiovascular Mortality, 1964-2010 
 
 
Abstract 
  Mortality from coronary heart disease in the United States 
has fallen 60% from its peak. Cardiologists and epidemiologists 
have debated whether this decline reflects risk factor control 
or the power of medical therapeutics.  Attempts to resolve this 
debate and guide health policy have generated sophisticated 
datasets and techniques for modeling cardiovascular mortality.  
Neither effort, however, has provided specific guidance for 
health policy.  Historical analysis of the decline debate and 
the development of cardiovascular modeling offers valuable 
lessons for policymakers about tensions between medical and 
public health strategies, the changing meanings of disease 
prevention, and ability of evidence-based research and models to 
guide health policy.  Policymakers must learn to open up the 
black box of epidemiological models -- and of their own decision 
making processes -- to produce the best evidence-informed policy. 
   2 
 
 
  At some unnoticed moment in the mid-1960s, mortality from 
coronary heart disease (CHD) in the United States peaked and 
began to decline.  Even though CHD remains the leading cause of 
death worldwide, CHD mortality has fallen 60% from its zenith.
1  
Although this may represent the greatest public health 
achievement of the twentieth century, it is not clear who or 
what deserves credit.  Does the decline demonstrate the 
therapeutic power of modern medicine or the impact of lifestyle 
change and risk factor management?  Cardiologists and 
epidemiologists have struggled for nearly forty years to resolve 
this question.  They have developed sophisticated datasets and 
quantitative models of the factors that cause or mitigate 
cardiovascular mortality.  They hoped that their analyses would 
help policy makers decide whether to invest in treatment or 
prevention.  The analyses, instead, have consistently 
demonstrated the value of both. 
  Much can be learned by studying the history of the 
intersection of cardiovascular epidemiology and health policy in 
this decline debate.  As researchers’ methods evolved from 
anecdote to back-of-the-envelope calculations to complex models, 
increasing precision came at the cost of increasing opacity.  
Few readers will understand the subtle mechanisms and   3 
assumptions on which such models rely.  The models, however, 
have become more versatile and ubiquitous.  It is essential for 
policymakers to understand the promise and limitations of the 
models, the changing meanings of prevention, and the likelihood 
that empirical research might shape policy.  Just as the decline 
itself provided a “natural experiment” for cardiovascular 
epidemiologists, the decline debate provides an opportunity to 
analyze the dynamic interplay between knowledge production and 
health care policy. 
 
The Rise and Fall of Coronary Heart Disease 
  Heart disease devastated postwar America.  By 1960 it 
killed one-third of all Americans.  Led by the American Heart 
Association and the National Heart Institute, the country 
mobilized unprecedented resources against the scourge.  The 
first tidings of changing fortune came in 1964 when state health 
officials reported a decline in CHD mortality in California,
2 but 
this news received little attention.  Well into the 1970s, 
cardiologists and the national media sounded the alarm about the 
inexorable rise of CHD.  In March 1974, however, a “sign of 
spring” emerged.
3  Cardiologist Weldon Walker reported that age-
adjusted CHD mortality rates had actually been declining in the 
United States since 1963.
4  His announcement was met with guarded 
enthusiasm: not everyone was certain whether the decline was   4 
real or not.
5,6  Part of the problem was the delicacy of 
epidemiology as a historical science, dependent upon cause of 
death reporting with disease taxonomies that are constantly in 
flux.  Depending on how epidemiologists parsed mortality data, 
CHD reached its apogee in either 1963 or 1968.
4-7 
  Eager to reach consensus about the reality and causes of 
decline, director Robert Levy called leading researchers to the 
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute in October 1978 for 
what became known as the “Decline Conference.”
8  Epidemiologists 
and clinicians concluded that the decline -- a 20% drop between 
1968 and 1978 -- was “real.”  But debate continued on the second 
question: what had caused the decline?  The timing of the 
decline had coincided with too many relevant changes: with 
vigorous efforts to educate Americans about smoking, diet, and 
other CHD risk factors; with changes in medical care, including 
aggressive control of hypertension, specialized coronary care 
units, ß-blockers, and bypass surgery; and with the passage of 
Medicare and Medicaid. 
  This was not just an academic question.  Everyone present 
felt the “urgent need” to answer the question and allow 
“intelligent decisions about the allocation of scarce resources 
between competing programs.”
9  Clinicians, in particular, were on 
the defensive.  Inspired by the critiques by Thomas McKeown and 
Ivan Illich, debates raged in the 1970s about whether medicine   5 
made substantial contributions to the health of society and 
whether its contributions justified its growing cost.  These 
critiques cast a long shadow.  Speakers at the Decline 
Conference invoked Illich as a warning to those who would take 
the value of medicine for granted.
8  Proponents of both medical 
care and disease prevention knew that they had to make their 
case carefully. 
 
Quantifying the Value of Prevention and Treatment 
  The first decade of decline research saw arguments based 
simply on temporal association.  Walker, who noted that 
education campaigns in 1964 coincided with the onset of decline, 
favored prevention.
4  The accompanying editorial emphasized the 
impact of coronary care units.
3  Although concordance might 
suggest cause and effect, critics reminded that the evidence was 
circumstantial.  As preventive cardiologist Jeremiah Stamler 
complained in 1978, “when such multiple socio-medical trends 
evolve over the years, it is virtually impossible to make a 
definitive scientific assessment as to the role of each of them 
singly, and all of them together in causing the decline in 
mortality rates.”
10  Amid this uncertainty, an ecumenical 
solution appeared necessary.  As NHLBI’s Levy concluded, “both 
primary prevention through lifestyle changes and improved 
treatment regimes have played a role in the decline.”
7   6 
  Frustrated by their initial inability to solve “the case of 
the disappearing epidemic,” the researchers sought more rigorous, 
quantitative analyses of the impact of specific interventions.
11  
The Framingham Heart Study had identified specific risk factors 
that correlated with CHD mortality.  One team of researchers 
used Framingham data to argue that the observed 5 mg/dl drop in 
cholesterol levels since the 1960s would predict a 4.3% decline 
in CHD mortality.
12  Epidemiologist Michael Stern used Framingham 
algorithms to integrate changes in several risk factors.  He 
concluded that these changes accounted for 50% of the decline in 
men.
9  Stern, however, admitted that it was “not possible at 
present to quantify definitively” the relative impact of 
lifestyle changes and improved medical care -- “both have played 
a role.” 
  Researchers realized that they needed to distinguish 
between two effects: the extent to which prevention campaigns 
reduced the incidence of CHD and the extent to which medical 
care reduced fatality rates.
12  This required data on both 
incidence and mortality.  Motivated by the Decline Conference, 
researchers undertook community-based surveillance projects.  
The World Health Organization orchestrated the largest, MONICA.  
Researchers at 39 centers in 26 countries collected data about 
risk factors, medical care, event rates, case-fatality rates, 
and mortality from over 100,000 people.
13  These efforts did not   7 
yield decisive answers. To obtain high resolution data, 
researchers had to focus on specific sites which might not be 
representative.  They struggled to ensure consistent data 
collection and analysis.  Their analyses of aggregate population 
data (e.g., correlating changes in average risk factor levels 
and event rates) impeded their ability to decipher causal 
relationships.  Finally they realized that their basic 
assumptions -- risk factors determined event rates while health 
care influenced case fatality -- were too simplistic. 
 
The Emergence of Models and Simulations 
  Other cardiologists and epidemiologists took up the 
challenge from the Decline Conference and went in a different 
direction.  They adapted analytic techniques from systems 
engineering to produce more precise and integrated assessments 
of specific preventive and therapeutic interventions.  In 1984 
Lee Goldman (a cardiologist) and Francis Cook (an 
epidemiologist) published a model that recapitulated the passage 
of a CHD patient through the health care system, including 
emergency medical services, coronary care units, and surgical 
and medical treatment.
14  Each domain was divided into specific 
interventions that could be quantified with data from 
observational studies and then reassembled using simple 
arithmetic to calculate the number of lives saved.  For example,   8 
to enumerate the value of coronary care units, the authors 
estimated that 500,000 patients were hospitalized for heart 
attacks each year, 4.5% of whom suffered ventricular 
fibrillation, 88% of whom were successfully resuscitated: 
500,000 x 0.045 x 0.88 = 19,800 lives saved annually.  Similar 
calculations revealed the contributions of lifestyle 
interventions against dietary fat, cholesterol, smoking, obesity, 
and exercise. 
  The authors acknowledged the subjective assessments, 
approximations, and potential errors in their model.  But they 
celebrated when the interventions they modeled -- four 
therapeutic, four preventive -- combined to account for 90% of 
the decline between 1968 and 1976.
14  Lifestyle changes accounted 
for 54% of the total, a finding they confessed “may be as 
serendipitous as it is accurate.”  Goldman and Cook’s model, 
intelligible to multiple audiences, coupled rigorous literature 
review with explicit assumptions and transparent calculations.  
It remains the most-cited reference in the decline literature. 
  To take this analysis further, Goldman teamed up with 
Milton Weinstein to form the CHD Policy Model Research Group.  
In 1987 they developed the first computer model to forecast CHD 
mortality.
15  Their “state-transition” model simulated patient 
trajectories over time, considering the impact of primary 
prevention, the transition from health to CHD, and the impact of   9 
treatment and secondary prevention.  The model could be “run” to 
follow a simulated population as it aged and did or did not 
develop CHD.  These simulations could be compared against 
historical data to determine how much of the actual observed 
decline had been captured by the model.
16  With no adjustment for 
improving risk factors or treatments, the model over-estimated 
mortality between 1980 and 1990 by 34%.  When it took these 
interventions into consideration, the model came within 2.8% of 
the actual data.  The team concluded that a substantial portion 
of the decline must have come from these interventions. 
  Modeling has now become a popular tool in cardiovascular 
epidemiology, applied both to explain past declines and to 
predict future possibilities.  A 2006 review found 75 articles 
that used 42 different models to inform CHD policy.
17  But models, 
by their nature, are imperfect representations of reality.  They 
make simplifying assumptions to facilitate methodical analysis.  
Goldman and Cook, for instance, cautioned that their model “must 
be considered approximate at best … a perspective rather than a 
definitive explanation.”
14  This is not a problem so long as 
readers understand a model’s limits. 
  The challenge for readers is two-fold.  First, many 
different types of models exist.  Some are static, calculating 
effects based on the prevalence and impact of specific 
interventions in a population.  Others are simulations that   10 
analyze a computer-generated cohort of “individuals” as they age 
over time.  Second, the quality of models varies considerably.  
Are the assumptions explicit?  Are the mechanisms transparent?  
Have sensitivity analyses been done (e.g., to test the effect of 
different assumptions)?  Has the model been validated (e.g., 
tested against existing data sets)?  The 2006 review found that 
few of the 42 models met these quality criteria.
17 
  Consider several prominent examples.  Researchers working 
with the World Health Organization’s Disease Control Priorities 
Project developed a model of the global burden of disease.  They 
compiled data on morbidity and mortality of over 130 diseases 
and calculated what share of this burden could be attributed to 
specific risk factors.  Using assumptions about socioeconomic 
development and risk factor trends, they forecast the burden of 
disease in 2030.  CHD, increased by tobacco use, hypertension, 
and inactivity, and decreased by alcohol use, will remain the 
leading cause of death worldwide.
18  Such projections might help 
countries determine where to invest health resources. 
  A different model, IMPACT, focused on CHD decline.  
Developed by Scottish cardiologist and epidemiologist Simon 
Capewell, IMPACT, like Goldman’s initial analysis, quantified 
the utilization and impact of interventions to calculate the 
number of deaths prevented by each.
19  Capewell demonstrated his 
model on data from Scotland and found that of the deaths   11 
prevented between 1975 and 1994, 10% came from acute coronary 
care, 9% from treatment of hypertension, 8% from secondary risk 
factor management, 8% from management of heart failure, 2% from 
bypass surgery, 2% from aspirin, and 0.1% from angioplasty.  
Meanwhile, of the risk factors, smoking contributed 36%, 
cholesterol 6%, blood pressure 6%, and deprivation 3%.  Taken 
together, “risk factor reductions and modern treatments 
contributed almost equally,” 40% treatment, 51% prevention. 
  Capewell shared IMPACT widely, developing a website for the 
model and collaborating with researchers in many countries to 
run analyses on New Zealand, England and Wales, Finland, Ireland, 
the United States, Sweden, Canada, Italy, Iceland, China, Spain, 
and Northern Ireland.  Although results varied, they almost 
always shared responsibility with near equality: 42%-58% England 
and Wales, 47%-44% in the United Sates, and so forth.
20,21  Only 
in Scandinavian countries, such as Finland, where aggressive 
public health campaigns reduced consumption of dairy fat 
consumption, did this balance shift (23%-72%).
22 A microcosm of 
decline literature, IMPACT produced remarkably consistent 
results across time and place, half credit each to prevention 
and treatment. 
  IMPACT has also been adapted to predict the impact of 
interventions and “bring together public health professionals, 
clinicians and service commissioners in interactive scenario   12 
planning activities to inform policy decisions.”
23  For instance, 
an additional 372,000 deaths could be prevented if Americans 
achieved “ideal risk-factor levels.”
24  IMPACT can also detect 
disquieting trends.  Improvements in cholesterol, blood pressure, 
and smoking in the United States have been offset by worsening 
obesity and diabetes.
21 Decline has slowed and even plateaued for 
younger adults, “potential warning signs” that hard fought gains 
might soon be lost.
25 
  The most ambitious model, Archimedes, has been developed by 
David Eddy and Leonard Schlessinger at Kaiser Permanente.  
Archimedes attempts a “full-scale simulation model of human 
physiology, diseases, behaviors, interventions, and healthcare 
systems.”
26  It offers researchers, administrators, and policy 
makers the chance to “run clinically realistic virtual trials on 
any population and create compelling evidence to make decisions.”  
For instance, Eddy’s team simulated the impact of 11 prevention 
activities over 30 years in a representative population of 20- 
to 80-year olds.
27  They found that the interventions could 
prevent 63% of all heart attacks (or 36% using more realistic 
assumptions about treatment uptake).  Aspirin (in high risk 
patients), diabetes prevention, and weight loss had the biggest 
impact.  Only one intervention, smoking cessation, was cost 
saving.  The lowest value came from cholesterol reduction in low 
risk populations, a finding with “important policy and clinical   13 
implications, as it is currently one of the most heavily 
promoted of all the prevention activities.” 
 
Models and Their Discontents 
  The evolution of the decline debate has been animated by 
the prospect that historical modeling would inform health care 
policy by enumerating the relative contributions of risk factor 
management and medical interventions.  Researchers’ ambitions 
developed in parallel, from explaining the past to predicting 
the future.  But as researchers’ models have grown more powerful 
they have become less intelligible. 
  Archimedes, for instance, has been critiqued for being 
“extraordinarily opaque.”
28  This is a problem for anyone who 
believes that models are only useful if their inner workings can 
be understood.  Eddy, in response, has argued that transparency 
is a poor criterion for judging a model.  What matters is not 
how a model works, but how well it works.
29  And even the critics 
of Archimedes acknowledge that its “results are astounding.”
28  
Eddy and Schlessinger ran simulations of 74 randomized clinical 
trials of diabetes interventions and then compared their 
simulated results to the results obtained in the actual trials.  
They found a correlation coefficient of 0.99.  It remains to be 
seen whether researchers and policy makers will be more swayed 
by transparency or accuracy.   14 
  The inner workings of IMPACT, in contrast, are accessible 
to motivated readers.  Close analysis reveals several important 
features.  First, its outcome and implications are malleable: 
IMPACT can be run with different endpoints that yield different 
assessments.  Capewell developed IMPACT to analyze deaths 
prevented.  Beginning in the 2000s, his team ran parallel 
analyses of “life-years gained.”  Although treatment had had the 
upper hand in the deaths prevented analysis in the United States 
(47% to 44%), it lost out to risk factors on life-years gained 
(35% to 65%).
21,30  In England the shift was even starker, from 
42%-58% to 21%-79%.
20,31  Why the difference?  IMPACT calculated 
life-years gained by multiplying the number of deaths prevented 
by the median survival after the intervention.  Since prevention 
targets younger and healthier patients, they have longer median 
survival post-intervention, something that accentuates the 
benefit of prevention.
32  Researchers can conduct either analysis, 
aware of the diverging policy implications. 
  Second, these models apply a thin veneer of specificity 
atop a messy foundation.  IMPACT requires researchers to reduce 
the efficacy of each treatment to a single coefficient.
33  When 
conflicting data exist, researchers seek the most recent, least 
biased, and most representative estimates.
21  Researchers also 
estimate compliance rates, with a range from 50% among 
asymptomatic outpatients to 100% in hospitalized patients.  Both   15 
sets of estimates are, themselves, uncertain.
19  Estimating the 
contribution of risk factor reductions remains an even “less 
precise science.”
33  In Finland, for instance, risk factors 
explained either 53% or 71.8% of the decline, depending on 
whether the researchers derived their coefficients from Finnish 
or international studies.
22  Latitude in parameter estimates 
raises an important question.  Since the 1970s, analyses of CHD 
decline have generally assigned equal credit to prevention and 
medical care.  Does this mean that the analyses have reliably 
revealed a correct answer?  It might also mean that researchers’ 
expectations have subtly influenced their methods and produced 
expedient results. 
  Third, the models can sweep uncertainty under the carpet.  
Because of the potential variation in parameter estimates, 
IMPACT analyses include an analysis of extremes, using “maximum 
and minimum feasible values” to produce a range of estimates of 
deaths prevented.
19  For the United States, sensitivity analysis 
showed that the modeled parameters could explain anywhere from 
51% to 160% of the decline, not just the 91% advertised in the 
abstract.
21  The model could explain nearly all of the decline, 
or half of the decline, or substantial decline that had not 
actually happened. 
  Fourth, ambiguity about what IMPACT does or does not leave 
unexplained focuses attention on another issue: IMPACT and the   16 
other models can only analyze factors that have been quantified 
and measured.  It is no accident that they focus on the usual 
suspects, including smoking, blood pressure, body mass index, 
and the impact of specific medical interventions.  Less easily 
measured variables, such as stress or social context, get left 
out.  Social epidemiologist Michael Marmot conceded this point 
in his own foray into the debate in 1984: “’Stress’ is excluded 
from discussions of trends in mortality because of conceptual, 
definitional and measurement difficulties.”
34 
  Since social factors remain un-modeled, IMPACT researchers 
can attribute shortfalls to these “other, unmeasured risk 
factors.”
20  The magnitude of this “other” could be as high as 
24% (e.g., in Finland).
22  Life-years gained analyses erased “the 
other” altogether.
30,31  When one epidemiologist pointed out that 
the analysis of the United States had ignored the important role 
played by reduced air pollution,
35 Capewell offered a complex 
response.  While air pollution and other risk factors might 
account for the 9% unexplained, it was also possible that 
“imprecision in the measurement and modeling of the major risk 
factors (cholesterol, smoking, and blood pressure) might also 
account for much of the gap.”
36  How likely was this?  That 
depends on the model’s robustness.  With the sensitivity 
analysis revealing that IMPACT accounted for anywhere between   17 
51% and 160% of the actual decline, the “other” might be 
responsible for as much as 49%. 
  The role of non-traditional risk factors remains 
controversial.  As cardiovascular epidemiologists developed 
their models, social epidemiologists sought different causal 
explanations.  Marmot’s Whitehall Study demonstrated that CHD 
mortality correlated powerfully with occupational grade within 
the British civil service.  Subsequent work linked mortality to 
relative position in any status hierarchy, whether of education, 
income, or control.
37  The potential importance of social factors 
can be seen in the United States, where decline followed 
different trajectories in different parts of the country.  
Decline began in California, and then in other regions in the 
West and Northeast, before spreading from the coasts to the 
interior and from cities to rural areas.
6,7  Speakers at the 
Decline Conference recognized that these disparities held clues 
to causes of the decline, including socioeconomic status and 
lifestyle.
8 
  Other researchers have downplayed the significance of 
social variables.  A 2001 review concluded that 75% of all CHD 
deaths could be attributed to the three major risk factors -- 
cholesterol, blood pressure, and cigarettes.
38  One team re-
analyzed the Whitehall results and argued that Marmot’s 
mortality gradients were substantially explained by risk factor   18 
gradients along the occupational hierarchy.
39  Capewell’s team, 
aware of the potential role of diet, stress, or poverty, has 
modeled them when adequate data exist.  They found, for instance, 
that decreased deprivation (i.e., economic development) 
accounted for 3.4% of the CHD decline in England and Wales.
20  
Such modeling remains a work in progress.
24  In the meantime, 
researchers must balance the appeal of the quantitative models 
against awareness of the potentially important factors that they 
exclude. 
  One last point deserves mention.  Researchers have 
validated their models by testing how well they match the 
observed historical changes in risk factors, health care, and 
outcomes.  However, the ability of a model to explain the past 
is not a perfect marker of its ability to predict the future.  
This will be especially true if the models are applied to 
understand the emerging epidemic of CHD in developing countries. 
 
Conclusions 
  Protagonists in the decline debate have long sought answers 
that would guide policy choices between prevention campaigns 
(e.g., education targeting populations to bring about lifestyle 
change and reduce risk factors) and medical care (e.g., medical 
technology provided to individual patients).  Sometimes 
researchers have been ecumenical.  The final report of the   19 
Decline Conference assumed that changes in risk factors and 
improved medical care had both contributed.
8  Sometimes they have 
been oppositional.  Ford and Capewell subtitled their 2011 
review “Public Health Versus Clinical Care.”
24  The debate, as a 
result, has perpetuated long-standing tensions between medicine 
and public health,
40 even as it offered an olive branch by 
crediting both with substantial contributions to past decline 
and by offering each a substantial role in future policy. 
  Lost in the debate is recognition of how much the 
categories of medical care and prevention have changed.  
Prevention once meant ensuring the healthiness of lived 
environments: clean air, clean water, and clean food.  In the 
closing decades of the twentieth century, prevention has 
transmogrified and been integrated into biomedical regimes of 
surveillance and control.  Future health is increasingly ensured 
through compliance with pharmaceutical regimens, whether for 
diabetes, hypertension, or high cholesterol.  The persistent 
debate between treatment and prevention polices a boundary which 
becomes less meaningful each year.  The role of social forces in 
producing and ameliorating disease, in contrast, has largely 
been left without voice in the debates. 
  Is it likely, in the end, that the decline debate and its 
models will provide useful guidance to policy makers?  When the 
debate began, no one doubted whether particular preventive or   20 
therapeutic interventions had potential value: nearly all of 
them do.  The question was whether researchers could demonstrate 
a large enough differential value to justify difficult decisions 
about resource investment.  This has not happened.  Instead of 
favoring prevention or treatment, researchers’ findings have 
motivated calls for increased investment in both.  Better 
utilization of evidence-based therapies could save even more 
lives.  More aggressive campaigns against risk factors could 
prevent even more deaths.
41  The United States needed a 
“comprehensive strategy,” as did Finland and England and 
Wales.
20-22,24 
  Given the powerful interests at stake, it is no surprise 
that expedient results -- half credit each to medicine and 
public health -- emerged time and time again.  As Lewis 
Carroll’s Dodo bird observed, “everyone has won, and all must 
have prizes.”  Such conclusions provide little guidance to 
policy makers.  But even if a definitive answer did emerge for 
or against a particular strategy, should health policy 
necessarily follow suit?  The Archimedes analysis of CHD, for 
instance, did make a strong critique of statins and cholesterol 
lowering medications.
27  Confronted with such findings, policy 
makers face a difficult challenge.  First, they must decide if 
they can trust the result.  Models, like randomized clinical 
trials, need to be read critically.  Whether policy makers   21 
scrutinize a model’s inner workings (e.g., IMPACT) or check its 
validation studies (e.g., Archimedes), they must make the effort 
to understand the quality of the result.  If the model passes 
muster, then policymakers must weigh it against other factors 
that inevitably influence decisions.  When the IMPACT team 
examined this process in 2011, they were dismayed by what they 
found.
42  Policymakers felt that existing research was too 
uncertain, had poor local applicability, paid too little 
attention to social determinants, and was poorly communicated.  
They often gave more weight to their own intuitions, expert 
consensus, public opinion, stakeholder pressure, financial 
sustainability, and political viability. 
  Researchers and policymakers face a delicate situation.  As 
the Patient Centered Outcomes Research Institute takes shape 
amid increasing pressure to improve the efficiency and quality 
of health services, stakeholders will demand that research 
findings actually guide health policy.  But it is unlikely that 
any single model or research study will produce findings that 
are clear and reliable enough to justify transformative policy.  
Capewell’s team has emphasized that researchers and policymakers 
must both be aware of how “the concept of evidence is negotiated 
and socially constructed by and between individuals.”
42  
Policymakers must work to understand what kinds of knowledge are 
made and obscured in researchers’ analyses, they must learn what   22 
lessons can be drawn from a particular study despite its 
limitations, and they must be consciously aware of what else 
they consider (and the many limits of these consierations) when 
they formulate policy.  Just as they must open the black box of 
medical research and modeling, they must open the black box of 
their own decision making processes.  This will not guarantee 
perfect policy, but it will at least make clear how and why the 
policy was made. 
 
Acknowledgments: 
  The authors gratefully acknowledge feedback from many 
people, including Jerry Avorn, Henry Blackburn, Simon Capewell, 
Niteesh Choudhry, Lee Goldman, Joel Howell, Zubair Kabir, Aaron 
Kesselheim, Todd Olszewski, Gerry Oppenheimer, Will Shrank, 
Sarah Tracy, and six anonymous reviewers.  The research was 
supported by a RWJF Investigator Award in Health Policy Research 
from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation®, Princeton, New Jersey. 
 
   23 
 
REFERENCES 
 
1.  Heron MP, Hoyert DL, Murphy SL, Xu JQ, Kochanek KD, Tejada-
Vera B. Deaths: Final data for 2006.  Hyattsville, MD: National 
Center for Health Statistics; 2009. 
2.  Borhani NO, Hechter HH. Recent Changes in CVR Disease 
Mortality in California. Public Health Reports 1964;79:147-60. 
3.  Moser RH. Editorial: Signs of spring? JAMA 1974;227:1049. 
4.  Walker WJ. Coronary mortality: what is going on? JAMA 
1974;227:1045-6. 
5.  Gordon T, Thom T. The recent decrease in CHD mortality. 
Preventive Medicine 1975;4:115-25. 
6.  Stallones RA. The rise and fall of ischemic heart disease. 
Sci Am 1980;243:53-9. 
7.  Levy RI. Declining mortality in coronary heart disease. 
Arteriosclerosis 1981;1:312-25. 
8.  Havlik R, Feinleib M, eds. Proceedings of the conference on 
the decline in coronary heart disease mortality. Bethesda: 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; 1979. 
9.  Stern MP. The recent decline in ischemic heart disease 
mortality. Annals of Internal Medicine 1979;91:630-40.   24 
10.  Stamler J. George Lyman Duff Memorial Lecture. Lifestyles, 
major risk factors, proof and public policy. Circulation 
1978;58:3-19. 
11.  Gillum RF, Blackburn H, Feinleib M. Current strategies for 
explaining the decline in ischemic heart disease mortality. 
Journal of chronic diseases 1982;35:467-74. 
12.  Beaglehole R, LaRosa JC, Heiss G, et al. Serum cholesterol, 
diet, and the decline in coronary heart disease mortality. 
Preventive medicine 1979;8:538-47. 
13.  Grover SA. Role of WHO-MONICA Project in unravelling of the 
cardiovascular puzzle. Lancet 2000;355:668-9. 
14.  Goldman L, Cook EF. The decline in ischemic heart disease 
mortality rates. An analysis of the comparative effects of 
medical interventions and changes in lifestyle. Annals of 
Internal Medicine 1984;101:825-36. 
15.  Weinstein MC, Coxson PG, Williams LW, Pass TM, Stason WB, 
Goldman L. Forecasting coronary heart disease incidence, 
mortality, and cost: the Coronary Heart Disease Policy Model. 
American Journal of Public Health 1987;77:1417-26. 
16.  Hunink MG, Goldman L, Tosteson AN, et al. The recent 
decline in mortality from coronary heart disease, 1980-1990. The 
effect of secular trends in risk factors and treatment. JAMA 
1997;277:535-42.   25 
17.  Unal B, Capewell S, Critchley JA. Coronary heart disease 
policy models: a systematic review. BMC Public Health 2006;6:213. 
18.  Mathers CD, Loncar D. Projections of global mortality and 
burden of disease from 2002 to 2030. PLoS Medicine 2006;3:e442. 
19.  Capewell S, Morrison CE, McMurray JJ. Contribution of 
modern cardiovascular treatment and risk factor changes to the 
decline in coronary heart disease mortality in Scotland between 
1975 and 1994. Heart 1999;81:380-6. 
20.  Unal B, Critchley JA, Capewell S. Explaining the decline in 
coronary heart disease mortality in England and Wales between 
1981 and 2000. Circulation 2004;109:1101-7. 
21.  Ford ES, Ajani UA, Croft JB, et al. Explaining the decrease 
in U.S. deaths from coronary disease, 1980-2000. New England 
Journal of Medicine 2007;356:2388-98. 
22.  Laatikainen T, Critchley J, Vartiainen E, Salomaa V, 
Ketonen M, Capewell S. Explaining the decline in coronary heart 
disease mortality in Finland between 1982 and 1997. American 
Journal of Epidemiology 2005;162:764-73. 
23.  Buchan I, Ainsworth J, Carruthers E, et al. IMPACT: A 
generalisable system for simulating public health interventions. 
Studies in Health Technology and Informatics 2010;160:486-90. 
24.  Ford ES, Capewell S. Proportion of the decline in 
cardiovascular mortality disease due to prevention versus   26 
treatment: public health versus clinical care. Annual Review of 
Public Health 2011;32:5-22. 
25.  Ford ES, Capewell S. Coronary heart disease mortality among 
young adults in the U.S. from 1980 through 2002: concealed 
leveling of mortality rates. Journal of the American College of 
Cardiology 2007;50:2128-32. 
26.  Archimedes: Quantifying Healthcare. 2012. (Accessed 
05/15/2012, at http://archimedesmodel.com/.) 
27.  Kahn R, Robertson RM, Smith R, Eddy D. The impact of 
prevention on reducing the burden of cardiovascular disease. 
Circulation 2008;118:576-85. 
28.  Herman WH. Diabetes modeling. Diabetes Care 2003;26:3182-3. 
29.  Eddy DM. Accuracy versus transparency in pharmacoeconomic 
modelling: finding the right balance. Pharmacoeconomics 
2006;24:837-44. 
30.  Capewell S, Hayes DK, Ford ES, et al. Life-years gained 
among US adults from modern treatments and changes in the 
prevalence of 6 coronary heart disease risk factors between 1980 
and 2000. American Journal of Epidemiology 2009;170:229-36. 
31.  Unal B, Critchley JA, Fidan D, Capewell S. Life-years 
gained from modern cardiological treatments and population risk 
factor changes in England and Wales, 1981-2000. American Journal 
of Public Health 2005;95:103-8.   27 
32.  Gouda HN, Critchley J, Powles J, Capewell S. Why choice of 
metric matters in public health analyses: a case study of the 
attribution of credit for the decline in coronary heart disease 
mortality in the US and other populations. BMC Public Health 
2012;12:88. 
33.  Ford ES, Ajani UA, Croft JB, et al. Supplementary Appendix: 
Explaining the decrease in U.S. deaths from coronary disease, 
1980-2000. New England Journal of Medicine 2007;356:2388-98. 
34.  Marmot MG. Life style and national and international trends 
in coronary heart disease mortality. Postgraduate Medical 
Journal 1984;60:3-8. 
35.  Kabir Z. Decrease in U.S. deaths from coronary disease. New 
England Journal of Medicine 2007;357:941. 
36.  Taylor-Robinson DC, Capewell S. Decrease in U.S. deaths 
from coronary disease. New England Journal of Medicine 
2007;357:941. 
37.  Marmot MG. The status syndrome: How social standing affects 
our health and longevity. New York: Times Books; 2004. 
38.  Magnus P, Beaglehole R. The real contribution of the major 
risk factors to the coronary epidemics: time to end the "only-
50%" myth. Archives of Internal Medicine 2001;161:2657-60. 
39.  Stringhini S, Sabia S, Shipley M, et al. Association of 
socioeconomic position with health behaviors and mortality. JAMA 
2010;303:1159-66.   28 
40.  Brandt AM, Gardner M. Antagonism and accommodation: 
interpreting the relationship between public health and medicine 
in the United States during the 20th century. American Journal 
of Public Health 2000;90:707-15. 
41.  Capewell S, Ford ES, Croft JB, Critchley JA, Greenlund KJ, 
Labarthe DR. Cardiovascular risk factor trends and potential for 
reducing coronary heart disease mortality in the United States 
of America. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 
2010;88:120-30. 
42.  Orton L, Lloyd-Williams F, Taylor-Robinson D, O'Flaherty M, 
Capewell S. The use of research evidence in public health 
decision making processes: systematic review. PLoS One 
2011;6:e21704. 
 
 